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Abstract—Passwords are a burden on the user, especially
nowadays with an increasing number of accounts and a pro-
liferation of different devices. Pico is a token-based login method
that does not ask users to remember any secrets, nor require
keyboard entry of one-time passwords. We wish to evaluate its
claim of being simultaneously more usable and more secure than
passwords, whilst testing its support for frictionless deployment
to web-based services. Our main aim is to collect actionable
intelligence on how to improve it. In our study, we teamed up
with an Alexa Top 500 website, Gyazo, to offer this alternative
login mechanism to users intent on performing a real task of
image sharing. We focused on the ecological validity of the trial,
and gained knowledge both through the challenges of the trial
and the results generated. Users appreciated the ability to avoid
password entry but the overall benefit was mitigated by the
existing measures put in place by Gyazo to minimise the number
of times users are presented with a password entry box. Our
main finding is that providing enough benefit requires a solution
that applies across sites, rather than focusing on authentication
for a single site in isolation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, users are asked to create passwords everywhere
they go, which poses a significant cognitive and physical burden.
Creating and memorising a unique and strong password for
every service is an impossible undertaking [1]. In this situation,
users resort to different kinds of strategies ranging from
writing passwords down through reusing the same password for
multiple accounts to employing a password manager (e.g., [2]).
Not only are passwords a burden on memory, but also the
physical effort of password entry can cause disruption leading
to frustration and distraction from users’ actual work. Users’
coping strategies make the pain of passwords more bearable
but have been shown to lead to an authentication fatigue over
time [3]. At the same time, even if the user manages to create
and memorise a strong password, there is no guarantee that
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their accounts and accesses will stay secure. Almost every
month, we hear about high-profile password breaches [4] and
learn about companies’ poor password storage practices [5].
In this paper, we present the findings of a user study
conducted to evaluate a token-based password replacement
solution called Pico. Faced with the significant usability and
security shortcomings of passwords, Stajano [6] proposed Pico
as an alternative authentication scheme. In the implementation
we studied, Pico is a smartphone application that performs
authentication to a website, replacing the need for the user to
enter a username or password. The website displays a QR code
on its login page alongside the usual text entry fields. Rather
than typing into the fields, the user can instead open the Pico
app and use it to scan the QR code. A few seconds later, the
user is authenticated and the website automatically refreshes
to show that the user is logged in.
This interaction has the potential to reduce the cognitive and
physical burden of password creation, memorisation or storage
and entry. Pico would also make credentials more resilient to
security breaches – with Pico, even if the credentials file is
stolen, the credentials are of limited value and so the users do
not need to change them, and the damage to the company’s
reputation is limited.
We conducted a three-part user study exploring the usability,
deployability and perceived security of Pico when used for
authentication to a real-world image-sharing service called
Gyazo1. We carefully targeted the groups of users who
would find Pico most useful and asked them to use Pico to
log in to Gyazo for a period of two weeks. We collected
participant feedback and produced a rich set of quantitative and
qualitative data including telemetry, ratings, free-text responses
and interviews.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. We
conducted the first user study of fully-functional Pico for
login to a real-world service. We collected quantitative and
qualitative data in a three-stage user study exploring the
usability, deployability and perceived security of a token-based
solution. Our study also highlights the challenges associated
with conducting an authentication user study “in the wild” and
we share some lessons that we learned.
1 https://gyazo.com/
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Fig. 1. The Gyazo login screen with a Pico QR code.
II. BACKGROUND
Gyazo, an Alexa Top 500 website, is an image capture and
sharing website that offers two modes of operation. Users can
either capture a portion of their desktop as a screenshot using
an application installed on their computer, or upload images
captured through other means directly to the site. The website
interface then allows images to be organised, tagged and shared
with others, but Gyazo has focused particularly on providing a
frictionless workflow for capturing partial screenshots. The user
simply launches the application, at which point they can drag a
bounding box over the screen to capture an image. The interface
is minimal: the mouse cursor switches to a crosshair design and
once the drag is complete the image is automatically uploaded
and displayed in the browser. The authentication process is
subtle. The Gyazo application stores a non-expiring identity
token that it uses to authenticate when uploading an image.
This is stored in the user’s home folder so that images can be
uploaded without any further credentials being needed from
the user. While this token allows images to be uploaded, it
does not allow any deeper web access to the user’s account.
For this, the user must log in manually using username and
password. The gyazo.com website also uses browser cookies
to maintain a login session, which expire after one month.
Our Pico implementation does not affect image upload and
the identity token, but rather focuses on access to the website.
As shown in Figure 1, Pico adds a QR code to the login page
that a user scans with their smartphone. The user loads up
the Pico app on their phone, scans the QR code and is then
presently logged in to the site. Pico uses the data in the QR
code to trigger a background authentication, and from the user’s
perspective the site refreshes and moves from the login page
to their account dashboard.
III. RELATED WORK
The literature identifying systemic problems with passwords
as an authentication mechanism is well-known and goes back
decades [7], but the quest to replace them has turned out
to be a war of attrition. Over the years, numerous password
replacement schemes have been proposed and tested, each with
benefits that turned out to be too niche to achieve widespread
adoption.
Biddle et al. [8] survey research into graphical passwords as
a replacement for textual passwords. They conclude that studies
lack consistency, often failing to achieve rigorous evaluation of
security or usability. The evaluation checklist they provide for
addressing these failings identifies user studies and ecological
validity as an important factor.
The majority of studies evaluating authentication mech-
anisms have been laboratory-based trials. The mechanisms
studied include graphical passwords [8], Passfaces [9] and
grids (e.g. [10], [11]) to name a few. In reality, security-
related actions are secondary tasks and a study has to mimic
this set-up. Although researchers have been calling for robust
authentication studies for a long time now [12], many studies
still rely on simulated interactions in artificial set-ups [13],
failing to consider how authentication fits in with users’ daily
activities. If the interactions and logins are not real, the validity
of the studies is limited [14].
While in-the-wild studies have been conducted for other
security interactions such as warnings [15], testing authentica-
tion mechanisms in the wild is rare. A notable exception is the
work by Brostoff and Sasse [16] who studied Passfaces in a
three-month field trial with 34 students. The students had to use
Passfaces and passwords to access their course materials. The
authors found that when using Passfaces participants logged
in with a third of the frequency of logging in with passwords
since the login process was more time-consuming. Participants
also stayed logged in for longer when using Passfaces.
In recent years, several studies have been conducted to
assess the user experience of token-based credentials. Most
of them looked at technologies that used a token as part of a
two-factor authentication solution. Strouble et al. [17] studied
the introduction of the Common Access Card (CAC) to the US
Department of Defense (DoD). The CAC is a smart card and
photo ID, which DoD employees use for both opening doors
and logging in to computers. The introduction of the CAC
significantly impacted organisational productivity: employees
reported that the increased difficulty of accessing their emails
led them to log in less often when outside their primary
workplace. Also, over two thirds of employees inadvertently
left their CAC in the computer. The authors estimated this
resulted in a productivity loss of $10.4m. Similarly, Steves et
al. [18] studied authentication in a large US governmental
organisation. They found that employees disliked using RSA’s
SecurID and the elaborate login procedure discouraged them
from logging in remotely. Krol et al. [19] studied the user
experience of authentication tokens for UK online banking.
They found that the need to have a hardware token was a
source of inconvenience and it changed the way participants
went about doing banking, decreasing the frequency of login.
Participants reported being less satisfied with online banking
when more steps were required for the login process and if they
had to use a hardware token. UK banks have since been shifting
from physical to software tokens to relieve their customers of
the burden of carrying an additional device for generating a
one-time password.
Payne et al. [20] conducted a study using prototypes of
Pico created using plasticine and Polymorph. The researchers
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found that although having a physical authentication token
gave participants a feeling of tangible security, it also caused
anxiety as they felt it would make them more responsible for
their security. The usability problems of authentication tokens
identified by prior research and the results from the study by
Payne et al. [20] motivated the shift from Pico being a dedicated
authentication device to it being a smartphone application. This
reflects the shift in the industry from physical to software
tokens as can be seen for RSA and online banking in the UK.
Hence, the Pico project focused on developing a smartphone
application, an implementation of which we test in this paper.
Bonneau et al. [21] identified three overarching benefits
that an authentication mechanism should provide: usability,
deployability and security. In this study, we assess Pico’s
usability, deployability and perceived security. The original
idea of Pico was proposed by Stajano [6] in 2011. The work
has generated many technical results (e.g. see Goldberg et
al., Stajano et al. and others [22], [23]), but only one user
study has previously been conducted and published on non-
functional Pico prototypes [20]. Some recent work by Urueña
and Soto [24] has sought to empirically assess login times,
but currently the work is in its early stages. Analysis of the
empirical usability of a single-factor token-based password
replacement that is Memorywise-Effortless and Physically-
Effortless (in the jargon of Bonneau et al. [21]) remains an
important gap that we aim to fill.
IV. METHODOLOGY
As described in Section III, many studies in the field
have suffered from methodological shortcomings. To increase
ecological validity, we established a collaboration with a real-
life service – Gyazo – and asked users of this service to use
Pico. We conducted a multi-stage study to learn about the user
experience of Pico. We invited those Gyazo users who logged
in with high frequency.
A. Study stages
1) Identifying potential participants: In the first stage, we
requested that Gyazo identify a usergroup that logs in with
high frequency, which was operationalised as at least once
during the past week (note here that this is the number of times
the users entered their passwords to log in, not the number of
times they visited the site). This amounted to 1136 users. An
email was sent out to all these Gyazo users inviting them to
complete an initial questionnaire.
2) Initial questionnaire: The purpose of the questionnaire
was to investigate the reasons why the users logged in with
high frequency and to check whether Pico would fit into
their authentication routines. For example, we assumed Pico
would be of little use to those who had their Gyazo password
automatically entered for them by the browser or a password
manager. The questionnaire can be found in Appendix B. We
first asked about demographics (gender, age range), then about
their Gyazo login habits and general login behaviour. Finally,
we asked them for their phone OS, as Pico was only available
for Android, and their Google Play email address in order to
add them as beta testers.
3) Use of Pico for Gyazo: Overall, 29 participants met our
criteria, and we sent all of them an invitation email describing
the study and outlining the next steps. They were asked to
download the Pico Gyazo app and use it to log in to their
Gyazo account for the duration of the trial, which was set to
two weeks. Eleven went on to install the app and use it with
their Gyazo account.
4) Exit questionnaire: Two weeks after the installation of
the app, we sent each participant a link to the exit questionnaire
via email. The exit questionnaire consisted of seven questions.
(1) Participants were asked in how far they agreed or disagreed
with eleven statements about the user experience of Pico.
(2) They were asked to state how they would lock their phone
if all their passwords were stored on it. (3) They were provided
with a list of eight changes that could be made to Pico and
asked to rank them in terms of their usefulness. (4) They were
provided with a list of different real-life contexts and asked to
indicate if they would be more comfortable authenticating with
Pico, passwords or both in each context. (5) They were asked
if they had any suggestions for improving Pico. (6) They were
asked if they would continue using Pico. Finally, (7) they were
asked if they had any thoughts they wanted to share about Pico
and/or passwords. At the end of the survey, they were asked in
what currency they would like to receive the incentive which
was equivalent to £10.
5) Feedback interviews: All participants who completed
the exit questionnaire were invited to take part in a feedback
interview. Seven participants indicated their willingness to
be interviewed and we were able to arrange interviews with
five. One was conducted over landline, four over Skype. The
interviews were semi-structured, with the sequence in which
the questions were asked following the natural development of
the conversation. Appendix D shows the list of questions that
we used for one of our participants. While there was a basic set
of questions that we asked every interviewee, we also tailored
these to their questionnaire responses as far as possible.
B. Participants
We received 85 complete responses to the initial question-
naire; 69 respondents indicated they were male, twelve that
they were female and four chose the option “Other/prefer not
to say”. Their ages fell into the following ranges: 18–24 years –
56 respondents, 25–34 – 18, 35–44 – 7, 45–54 – 2, and 55–64
– 2. They were based in 25 countries as follows: United States
(26 respondents), Japan (13), United Kingdom (12), Canada (7),
Russia (3), Israel (2), Lebanon (2), Netherlands (2), Norway (2),
Bangladesh (1), Brazil (1), Colombia (1), Czech Republic (1),
Estonia (1), France (1), Germany (1), Greece (1), Italy (1),
Latvia (1), Portugal (1), Romania (1), Spain (1), Sweden (1),
Taiwan (1) and Vietnam (1).
The final sample of participants who downloaded and used
the Pico Gyazo app consisted of eleven individuals. One was
female, eight were male, while two preferred not to disclose
their gender. Their ages fell into the following ranges: 18–24
years – 9 participants, 25–34 – 2. Participants were resident in
six countries: United States (6), Brazil (1), Greece (1), Japan (1),
Latvia (1) and Spain (1).
We interviewed five participants; two male, one female and
two who selected the option “Other/prefer not to say”. Their
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Fig. 2. The configuration screen (left) and scanner interface (right).
ages fell into the following ranges: 18–24 years – 4 participants,
25–34 – 1. Four participants were based in the United States
(Illinois, Mississippi, New York and Oklahoma) and one in
Latvia.
C. Apparatus
Participants were invited to install the Pico Gyazo app on
their Android phones via Google Play, a 4.16 MB download.
The first time the user opens the app, they are invited to enter
their Gyazo account details (username, password) as shown in
Figure 2. These are stored by the application to allow the app
to perform the automatic login on future occasions. The user is
then presented with a QR code scanner as shown in Figure 2.
From this point on, until the user clears the app data (which
only one of the users did during the trial), opening the app
will bring the user directly to the scanner page. The interface
is simple and consists of just this one screen.
The app represents the software needed on the client-side
for Pico authentication. Since we did not have direct access
to the backend server code, we developed a reverse proxy
for overlaying the Pico interface onto the Gyazo site. With
permission from Gyazo, we had the pico.gyazo.com subdomain
redirected to our own nginx2 reverse proxy relaying the Gyazo
website. Users visiting pico.gyazo.com saw the same site as
users visiting the gyazo.com website with two exceptions. The
main change was to inject a few additional <script> HTML
elements into the login page. These elements pulled in our own
Javascript source that performed some client-side rewriting of
the page to inject the dynamic Pico QR code into the login
page (the result of which was as shown earlier in Figure 1).
The second change was to add a new page that we passed
to potential study participants. The page contained a brief
description of the study, links through to the study information
sheet and a direct link to the initial questionnaire. Since these
changes were done with the cooperation of Gyazo, we were
able to ensure that the certificate used for the pico.gyazo.com
reverse-proxied site was valid (i.e. showed as a green padlock
in participants’ browsers).
2 https://www.nginx.com/
TABLE I. EVENTS GENERATED BY THE PICO APP
Starting unconfigured Successful authentication
Starting configured Checking username and password
Configuration complete Credentials checked out
Scanned QR code Incorrect credentials
Scan cancelled by user Open credentials page
Attempting login
TABLE II. EVENTS GENERATED BY THE LOGIN PAGE
Page loaded and updated
Error getting new channel
Pico accepted message on Rendezvous channel
Message from Pico authenticated
The Pico process for websites involves the Pico phone app
performing the login on behalf of the user. Gyazo returns a
cookie to the app, which it then sends on to the client-side
Javascript running on the website. This Javascript can then
inject the cookie into the browser’s cookie store in order to
initiate an authenticated session for the user. As part of this
process, the app must be able to communicate with the client-
side Javascript. The channel of communication is chosen by
the Javascript and the channel identifier (a URL) is embedded
in the QR code. When the QR code is scanned, the app is able
to extract this channel identifier, which can then be used by the
app for communication with the Javascript. We use an untrusted
external rendezvous point channel for this communication (see
our earlier work for details [25]), identified using the unique
channel name.
We peppered both the app and proxied site with keen.io3
calls for collecting event-based telemetry data. These allowed
us to measure timings for various stages of the login process,
including startup, configuration, QR-scanning and completion.
The full set of events is shown in Table I and II for the Pico
app and login page respectively.
For the configured phone we were able to form an identifier
for the user generated as a salted hash of their Gyazo username,
sent with each event. This ensured data was kept anonymised
as it passed through keen.io (since publicly the hashes cannot
be reversed), but could be de-anonymised by us given our
knowledge of the participants’ Gyazo usernames. However,
events generated for the unconfigured app and for the website
had no access to the username. Consequently, we also collected
the IP address and the random rendezvous channel identifier
described earlier. This allowed us to correlate events even
where the user was not immediately identifiable. Not all events
could be tied to specific users, for example a portion of the
events we received could be traced back to search engine
webcrawlers accessing the pico.gyazo.com domain. Analysis of
the IP addresses recorded against orphaned events and a process
of elimination allowed us to account for all data generated by
the participants.
D. Data analysis
Owing to the small sample sizes in our study, we report
only on the quantitative results using descriptive rather than
inferential statistics.
When it comes to qualitative data, we conducted five in-
depth interviews that were audio recorded and later transcribed.
3 https://keen.io/
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TABLE III. SELF-REPORTED FREQUENCIES WITH WHICH RESPONDENTS
MANUALLY TYPED IN THEIR PASSWORDS ON GYAZO.COM.
Fewer than once per week 59
Fewer than once per day 8
Roughly once per day 9
Roughly 2-4 times per day 7
Roughly 5 or more times per day 2
The interviews lasted 26 minutes on average (range: 19–36)
and the transcripts were on average 3917 words long (range:
3099–5637). The transcripts were analysed using thematic
analysis [26] by two researchers as follows. They coded the
first interview independently and then created a joint codebook,
based on which they coded the remaining four interviews.
After this, they merged their codebooks and re-coded all five
interviews in line with this codebook. The inter-rater reliability
was high with a Cohen’s Kappa coefficient of 0.84, which is
considered to be excellent [27].
E. Research ethics
The study was conducted after having been approved by the
Ethics Committee at the University of Cambridge Computer
Laboratory (approval number: 384).
V. RESULTS
A. Initial questionnaire
We contacted 1136 users inviting them to take part and
85 respondents completed the initial questionnaire (out of 268
who followed the invitation and opened it). We asked the
respondents how often they manually typed in their Gyazo
password. Table III shows the results. Out of 85 respondents,
59 (69.4%) logged in fewer than once per week, 8 (9.4%) fewer
than once per day and 9 (10.6%) roughly once per day.
This was followed by an open-ended question asking
respondents to explain the main reason why they had to
enter their password. Out of 85 respondents, 65 provided
an answer to this question. Switching to another device was
mentioned in 19 cases; for example, R82 wrote: “Signing
in on a different computer”. 17 respondents explained they
needed to enter a password in order to log in and access their
images. Our intention had been to understand why respondents
enter their password given the service sets long-lived cookies,
and we were therefore surprised by the literal interpretation
of the question, suggesting we should have phrased it more
carefully. In 15 cases, respondents stressed they had to enter
their password after clearing their cookies, R54 explained:
“Because i clear my cache at the end of the day to speed up
the browser”. Seven respondents mentioned having to log in
to Gyazo when switching to another browser. Six respondents
said their perception was that they were never asked to enter
their password. In four cases, the respondents said that they
had to enter it if their password manager/browser failed to do it
for them; R57 explained: “SafeInCloud doesn’t actually work”.
Three respondents mentioned they entered their password
manually because of security reasons; R17 wrote: “I never use
the option in Chrome save password because of that and also
I think its safer to type the password everytime.” Interestingly,
two respondents also mentioned they logged out intentionally in
order to practise their password, as R18 explained: “To better
memorize it”.
TABLE IV. SELF-REPORTED METHODS IN WHICH RESPONDENTS
MANAGED THEIR PASSWORDS. RESPONDENTS COULD CHOOSE ALL THAT
APPLIED.
Let my browser remember my password 63
Password manager/plugin/extension (e.g. LastPass, 1Password) 19
Password generator 13
Reset password by email when I need to login 14
Password containing personal information 4
Stored in a file/on a piece of paper 10
Using the same password on multiple sites 30
No special methods (I just remember all of my passwords) 17
Other 10
We asked respondents what their password management
methods were. They could choose from a list of eight options
and/or add their own. Table IV shows the results. The most
popular password management strategy was letting the browser
remember the password, employed by 74.1% of respondents,
followed by 35.3% of respondents who used the same pass-
word across multiple sites and 22.4% who used a password
manager/plugin/extension.
B. Telemetry results
The Pico app was downloaded by twelve participants but one
participant never used it to authenticate. Overall, we recorded 45
authentication events across eleven active participants (M= 4.1,
range: 1–14).
For each authentication event, our telemetry collected the
timings for the following authentication steps: starting the
app, loading the Gyazo login page, scanning the QR code,
successful authentication and confirmation from the website.
An event lasted an average of 47.5 seconds (range: 8–292).
Of the 45 authentication events recorded, three were missing
telemetry data for some steps and were therefore excluded from
subsequent analysis. Out of the remaining 42 fully recorded
events, 23 started with the participant opening the Pico app
and then opening the page, while 19 started with them loading
the page and then opening the app. Table V show the average
times and ranges for each of the steps. For the first step, if
participants started by opening the app and then went on to
open the Gyazo website, it took them on average 35.2 seconds,
whereas the other way around it was 33.7. While Steps 1
and 2 were dependent on both the participants’ speed and the
system response time, steps 3 and 4 depended on the response
time of various systems. The Pico protocol involves the usual
POST request – sent by the Pico to the website – needed to
authenticate the user, followed by four messages sent between
the Pico and the user’s browser (two in each direction) to
securely install the cookie. The timings of these last two steps
are in line with what we would expect to see.
C. Questionnaire and interview results
In what follows, we report on the findings from question-
naires and interviews. Since both touched upon similar themes,
we group the results by theme. When we refer to participants
in the questionnaires, we speak of “respondents” abbreviated
as “R01” for “Respondent 1”. When we refer to participants
in the interviews, we speak of “interviewees”, abbreviated as
“I01”.
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TABLE V. A BREAK-DOWN OF STEPS NEEDED FOR AN AUTHENTICATION EVENT WITH DURATIONS.
Step no. Authentication step Mean time
Step 1 start Pico app – load page or load page – start Pico app 34.55
Step 2 start Pico app – scan QR code 9.62
Step 3 scan QR code – successful authentication 2.40
Step 4 successful authentication – confirmation from website 0.93
D. Primary task – Gyazo
We began each interview by asking the interviewee about
their use of Gyazo in order to ground their perceptions of Pico
in the primary task of using the service. Two interviewees had
been using the service for two years, two for one year and
one only signed up a month before the study. All interviewees
used it for personal use, and one also used it for professional
reasons because they were an artist. Four interviewees stated
they were not currently premium users; one stated that they
used to be but could not afford it any more. Two mentioned
that they used Gyazo on a daily basis.
We asked the interviewees in what situations they had to
enter their password. Two stated they had to enter it when
they deleted cookies; two said they needed to enter it when
they switched or shared devices. Most people stay logged in
long-term, and as a result three interviewees reported they had
to deliberately log out to use Pico in the trial.
E. Perceptions of Pico
Three interviewees found Pico to be easy to use. Two
described it as “fairly quick”, and two as convenient. I04
explained: “I thought it was very effective, it was very quick,
very easy, convenient. . . I definitely, I like the idea versus
having to put in the password every time.” I02 explained how
the swift login with Pico encouraged them to log in more often:
“I used [Pico] on my college computer a couple of times, and
it was just more convenient [. . . ] like I need to show a fellow
student an image or something like that, so it was just a lot
easier to just pop onto the desktop and scan in, so, slightly
more, yeah, than using a password.” Two interviewees also
described Pico as “cool”.
In the exit questionnaire, we asked the respondents to what
extent they agreed with eleven statements about Pico on a five-
point Likert scale from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree
(5). The mean and median scores are shown in Figure VI.
Respondents disagreed the strongest with statement 9, that
they were concerned about others observing the QR code when
they logged in to Gyazo. Participants agreed the strongest with
statement 7, that the Pico-Gyazo app was straightforward to
download.
The scores for cognitive effort tended to be low with four
participants indicating they disagreed strongly with statement
1 (i.e. they felt Pico does not require cognitive effort). In
the interview, we asked one participant who agreed with the
statement (score: 2) to elaborate on their rating. It turned out
the participant was unsure about the meaning of the word
“cognitive”. After an explanation of what it meant, they revised
their score saying: “I don’t think there’s any [cognitive effort],
because you don’t really have to remember anything, you just
have to unlock, you know, your password on your phone, and
it’s pretty much you use it daily, so the chances of you forgetting
it is pretty much non-existent.” (I03).
F. Familiarity with QR codes
Three participants said they were already familiar with
scanning QR codes: I01 had used them with the Nintendo 3DS,
I05 as part of the LINE messaging app, and I02 as part of a
school project. Two interviewees found QR codes inconvenient
due to the fact that scanning them required having their phone
at hand. I01 explained: “I worked with QR codes before so
it wasn’t too hard to work with. It just seemed a little bit
inconvenient. I mean, getting out my phone and, ’cos I don’t
usually have my phone on me when I’m at the computer, it’s
usually somewhere else, so I had to bring my phone over and I
had to scan the screen.” I03 experienced some problems with
scanning a QR code because of a low quality phone camera
and monitor, saying: “the problems were coming I think from
my monitor, my old one, I had the really old one, the big one,
CRT monitor, which basically, every time I tried to scan it, it
was flickering, so it’d make it harder to scan it.”
G. Pico vs passwords
We asked our interviewees to compare Pico to passwords.
Two participants found Pico was more convenient, and two
found it was faster than passwords. Three interviewees thought
that Pico was more secure than passwords. When asked about
the security of Pico, I04 said: “I think I put it as around the
same” but then explained that in its current state, Pico might
be more secure because it had not been a target for attackers
yet: “I don’t really know what the exact basics are between
getting into an account using someone’s password, so not
exactly sure how someone would hack you using Pico, but I
guess technically it would be more safe because the technology
isn’t out yet, but they’d figure it out eventually, if it becomes a
major thing.”
Two interviewees argued that passwords were better because
Pico was slower than entering a password. I03 thought that
passwords were more secure because they existed only in the
user’s memory: “if you have a secure password and you’re
pretty much the only one person who knows it, I think that’s
the most secure thing you could possibly have.”
H. Suggestions for improvements
In the exit questionnaire, we provided respondents with a
list of eight possible improvements that could be made to Pico
and asked them to rank these in order of priority from the
most to the least important. Figure 3 shows the results. The
improvement ranked first most often referred to introducing
login with Pico to more websites than just Gyazo; it was ranked
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TABLE VI. STATEMENTS CAPTURING THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE USER EXPERIENCE OF PICO WITH MEAN AND MEDIAN SCORES ON A 1-5 LIKERT
SCALE, 1 – STRONGLY AGREE, 5 – STRONGLY DISAGREE.
Statement Mean Median
1 Using Pico requires cognitive effort. 3.5 3
2 Using Pico requires physical effort. 3.3 3
3 It is easy to learn how to use Pico. 1.4 1
4 Pico makes me more efficient. 2.3 2
5 I am afraid of losing my Pico device and losing access to my account. 3.5 4
6 I find scanning the QR codes reliable. 1.6 1
7 Installation of the Pico-Gyazo app was straightforward. 1.3 1
8 I feel secure using Pico to log in to Gyazo. 1.6 1
9 I am concerned about others observing the QR code when I log in to Gyazo. 4.3 4
10 Using Pico makes me more concerned about my smartphone being stolen. 3.8 4
11 Overall, I find Pico makes my online activity easier. 2.0 2
either first or second by seven out of eleven respondents. The
issue that was ranked bottom most often (four times) was
removing the need to scan the QR code, although it was also
ranked first by two participants.
Apart from the ranking task, respondents were also asked
if they had any other suggestions. Four respondents made
suggestions related to security – login security and recovery
from loss. The login-related suggestions included requiring the
user to enter a username as an extra hindrance to potential
attackers and requiring two-factor authentication in certain
contexts. The suggestions relating to recovery from loss
included creating a “button to disable the Pico app in the
website if the phone is lost or stolen” (R01) and having a
fall-back login method if the phone is lost. Otherwise, two
respondents stressed they would like to see Pico integrated with
more websites. R10 explained: “Just more websites, this is way
more easy to login into websites.” One respondent suggested
other modes of logging in apart from scanning a QR code,
such as “timing tap and voice recognition” (R03).
During the interview, we also asked about suggestions for
improvements. Two participants suggested extending the use of
Pico to other websites or services. I03 explained: “let’s say from
your desktop you just, you have like a, I don’t know, a program
that you can basically just open and then scan it, but instead
of going on the website and trying to log in. I think that’d
make it even more handy.” A further two participants suggested
replacing scanning the QR code with a different interaction,
I02 suggesting use of NFC (Near Field Communication) as
they believed NFC would be more secure than a QR code.
Other security-related suggestions included blocking the
Pico app remotely, asking for an email address as a username
when logging in (mentioned by the same participant as in the
questionnaires) and requiring a password when logging in from
a new device. Additionally, one participant suggested removing
the need of a data connection when using Pico.
I. Phone use habits
We also asked participants about their phone use habits
to gauge how Pico fitted into their routine. In the interviews,
two interviewees reported using a pattern lock, two using a
4-digit PIN, and one not having a lock at all. Participants
provided all kinds of reasons for preferring one method over
another. I02 explained: “I don’t particularly care for pattern
locks because I have rheumatoid arthritis. So, using my thumbs
in that particular way is a bit painful, so for convenience
like I don’t. . . ” When asked what they were using instead
they told us: “I have a PIN on it. [. . . ] But, but it’s also
the PIN to my debit card!” The interviewee then went on to
discuss how they thought fingerprint scanners were the most
convenient way of logging in. When asked to compare the
security of the different methods of locking their phone, I02
responded: “I know that they can be compromised, but at the
same time I don’t necessarily think that affects most users. Most
people aren’t going to be maliciously attacked and have their
fingerprint stolen, but I think in higher security situations that
might be a problem. I wouldn’t, if I were say a diplomat, or
something like that, I don’t think I would trust my fingerprint
that much you know, but if it’s just an average Joe, sure, why
not.”
In the exit questionnaire, we asked the respondents what
method of locking they would use if all their passwords were
stored on their phone. We provided them with six possibilities
as shown in Table VII. The most popular options were a pattern
lock and a fingerprint scanner with six mentions each, followed
by a 6-digit PIN with five. A 4-digit PIN and a password
both had three respondents select them. There was also the
possibility to enter their own method of locking. One participant
mentioned facial recognition, while another suggested no lock
at all.
J. Password management strategies
When asked about their current password management
strategies, three interviewees said they used password managers
and three reused the same passwords for multiple systems.
I05 reflected on the fact that some accounts were more
valuable than others as they guarded access to other things,
they explained: “for Google especially, it has to be incredibly
secure because you’re asking that to then be responsible for
everything else; it’s like putting your stuff in a safety deposit
box in a bank where you don’t trust the people running the
bank.”
TABLE VII. PREFERRED WAYS TO LOCK PHONE WITH NUMBERS OF
PARTICIPANTS WHO CHOSE IT. PARTICIPANTS COULD CHOOSE AS MANY AS
THEY WISHED.
4-digit PIN 3
6-digit PIN 5
password 3
pattern lock 6
fingerprint 6
slide lock 1
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0 2 4 6 8 10
Reduce the download size of the app
Improve the speed of the app
Simplify the installation and initial configuration of the app
Remove the need to scan the QR code to log in
Remove the need to have a data connection when logging in
Allow me to log in to more websites (not just Gyazo)
Improve security of the app further
Allow me to block the app remotely in case of loss
Ranked first
Ranked second
Ranked third
Ranked fourth
Ranked fifth
Ranked sixth
Ranked seventh
Ranked eighth
Fig. 3. Participants’ ranking of the different improvements that could be made to Pico. The darker the shading the higher the priority ranking of the improvement.
K. Contexts of use
We showed our respondents a series of eleven activities for
which they would normally authenticate, and asked them to
choose if they would rather use Pico, passwords or both/neither
in these situations. Figure 4 shows the results. While respon-
dents’ preferences tend to be evenly distributed between Pico,
passwords and both/neither, no respondent chose passwords
for logging in to a social networking site (e.g. Facebook) from
a different computer.
In the interviews, I03 explained Gyazo was a low-security
context saying: “the chances of someone stealing your phone
and trying to log in [to] your Gyazo is pretty low, and especially
because there’s nothing on it, you can just cheat the pictures
and take pictures on that account.” Apart from the value of the
account, frequency of use was a consideration our interviewees
mentioned. While one interviewee felt passwords are more
suitable for less frequent activities, two argued passwords would
be better for more frequent ones saying: “it’s easy for me to
memorise passwords that I frequently have to log in to, because
that’s just how you memorise, is through use” (I05). The
interviewee further explained where Pico would be a suitable
authentication method: “say it’s that you only log into once a
month, maybe it’s to pay your car insurance or something or a
forum that you don’t go on very frequently. I could see [Pico]
being really handy because it keeps it secure [. . . ] instead of
having to make a password for each and every single unique
obscure thing that you do, you know that this, that the QR
code gives you a level of security.”
L. Deploying Pico for Gyazo
One of the key observations from Bonneau et al. [21] is
that uptake of effective password replacement solutions has
been hindered by the relative difficulty of their deployment in
comparison with passwords. This helps explain the otherwise
perplexing endurance of passwords given their shortcomings
in relation to security and usability.
Ease of deployment has therefore been an important
consideration for Pico. We especially wanted the ability to
integrate Pico with the Gyazo site, without having to make
major changes to the site structure, backend code, or database.
As described in Section IV-C, we used a reverse proxy and
injection of client-side Javascript using a sub_filter rewrite
rule. This allowed us to add the Pico QR code onto the site’s
usual login form without altering any of the backend code. We
applied this only to a subdomain (pico.gyazo.com), but we
could have applied it to the main domain equally easily.
For this to work, all of Pico’s server-side authentication code
had to be executed on the client machine using Javascript in
the browser. This is unusual: usually the interaction is between
the backend server and the user (mediated by the client-side
browser). In our case, the client-side browser actually initiates
the protocol, while the authentication takes place between the
Pico and the website over an entirely separate channel (the
phone’s data connection).
When developing the solution we were confident that this
would be transparent to the end-user, but it was reassuring
that none of the participants claimed to have any difficulty
understanding the login procedure using Pico. Given the more
involved protocol, and use of client-side Javascript, we were
less certain that the implementation would run fast enough to
satisfy user requirements. Once again we were pleased with the
results. The average time taken for the protocol to complete
was 3.33 seconds, a small proportion of the overall time users
spent during the authentication process, which averaged 47.5
seconds. The opinion of the participants differed on whether
they perceived Pico to be faster (two participants) or slower
(two participants).
VI. DISCUSSION
The obtained findings imply that Pico provided a good
experience for our participants. For example, they found that
it was easy to learn how to use Pico and that it was secure.
Our findings also imply that the added value of Pico was not
significant for a service like Gyazo that uses long-lived cookies
expiring every month. This was most evident in the answer to
the question about how Pico could be improved, where a large
proportion of participants ranked extending the use of Pico
to other websites as their top preference. All these findings
have the caveat that we obtained insufficient data to be able
to statistically validate them. This followed from our decision
to invite users who logged in more frequently and entered
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Contributing to an online forum
Buying tickets online
Browsing for plane tickets
Checking in for flights online
Topping up your travel card online
Bidding on items on an online auction site (e.g. eBay)
Logging in to a social networking site (e.g. Facebook) from a different computer
Unlocking the front door to your home
Unlocking the door to your office or place of work
Paying for an item in a shop
Unlocking and starting your car
Pico preferred
Passwords preferred
Equally comfortable/uncomfortable
Fig. 4. Numbers of participants who would prefer using Pico, passwords or both/neither for different every-day activities.
their passwords manually. This choice made the technical and
logistical aspect of the study simpler but produced very limited
data. Our take-away message is that in order to validate the
preliminary conclusions that were implied by this study we
must conduct further studies to collect more data. A way to
validate these conclusions would be to extend the deployment
of Pico to more websites or extend the duration of the study
on Gyazo. Given that Gyazo’s cookies are set to expire after
a month, even a year-long study might be expected to collect
only around twelve logins per user, so extending it this way
would have a prohibitive cost given the limited data involved.
Therefore, our focus should be on deploying Pico to more
websites.
A. Lessons learned from conducting an in-the-wild study
Researchers may not have a choice when it comes to
the service where the mechanism is deployed. We had a
collaboration with Gyazo, which was a great advantage, but
users’ frequency of login to the service was low since Gyazo
uses long-lived cookies. We attempted to mitigate this by
inviting users who logged in more often.
Another problem we encountered related to participant
recruitment. Participation in the trial was on an opt-in basis
and the number of participants who volunteered and later
participated was low for a service that has seven million users.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We conducted a three-part study to understand how users
would react to Pico as a replacement for passwords on a major
website. It was the first study of fully functional Pico. The study
stands out from previous research through its high ecological
validity due to deployment in front of a real-world service.
Our findings show that participants liked the idea of Pico and
generally found it to be secure and less cognitively demanding
than passwords. However, some disliked the need to scan QR
codes and suggested replacing them with another modality of
interaction. There was also a general consensus that participants
wanted to see Pico extended for use with more sites.
Our findings will help us shape the future development of
Pico. We are planning to look into offering users more choice
when it comes to the modalities of authentication, including
use of Bluetooth and NFC. Our plan is also to enable login not
just to more websites but other types of systems and physical
devices as well. Future iterations of the Pico authentication
scheme will be tested in different contexts, for accesses of
different value. Moreover, more work is needed in providing a
comparison with possible alternatives, to establish the types of
context in which Pico is particularly effective.
We presented several challenges that we faced when
deploying Pico to a real-world service. We were fortunate
to have an excellent collaboration with Gyazo, who were very
helpful and responsive to our requests. The trial demonstrated
how Pico can be deployed to a large website passively, that is
without having to change the code or database of the site, and
without affecting the running of the service.
We were satisfied that Pico could be integrated as a method
of logging in to Gyazo with ease. Technologically the trial
was a success, and users had no difficulty in understanding
and using Pico. Our recruitment difficulties were our biggest
challenge in the study. On the one hand, it is a result of
our deliberate methodological approach of not relying on
“professional participants” or psychology or computer science
undergraduates. On the other hand however, this might be
an early warning sign that achieving wide-spread consumer
adoption of Pico could be a struggle.
Users tend to prefer to stick with the familiar despite its
significant drawbacks, following the rule of “better the devil you
know” [28]. Users are accustomed to passwords and understand
them very well. Our future efforts will focus on creating a
smoother path to the adoption of Pico. We shall develop Pico
to more seamlessly fit into users’ daily lives, be adaptable to
their security and usability needs and provide greater utility
than passwords.
Both the trial findings and challenges support the conclusion
that developing a suitable replacement for passwords requires
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breadth, not just depth. Our struggle to collect sufficient data
stemmed significantly from the low frequency of password
use on the Gyazo site. At the same time, the possibility of
accessing more websites using Pico came out clearly as the
most desired feature. Running a similar trial but across a larger
range of participant-selected sites would help us validate these
findings.
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APPENDIX A
CONSENT FORM TEXT
As part of this research study, I am willing for the following
data to be recorded during the course of the experiments (you
must agree to all three to participate):
1) My answers to the questionnaires.
2) The analytics generated by the Pico Gyazo App
running on my phone.
3) The analytics about my use of the Gyazo website.
All information will remain strictly confidential. At no time
will my name, personal details, any identifiable recording, or
any other identification be used externally. I understand that
I am free to ask questions and can withdraw my consent and
stop participation at any time during the study. By agreeing
to this form, I am authorising the researchers conducting this
study to collect and analyse the data that is generated as a
result of my participation in the study. If I do not agree then I
will not be able to participate in the study.
Please read each of the statements below carefully. By accepting
this form you are agreeing to them all.
1) I am over 18 years old.
2) I have been given the information sheet that I have
read and understood.
3) I have been informed in advance as to what my task(s)
would be and what procedures would be followed.
4) I understand that I can ask questions at any time during
the trial by emailing cl-pico-gyazo@lists.cam.ac.uk.
5) I understand that not everyone who completes the
initial questionnaire will be accepted on to the trial.
Acceptance is at the sole discretion of the researchers.
6) I am aware that data collected will be anonymised,
kept in accordance with the data protection act, and
analysed by the research team as part of their studies.
7) I am aware that the Pico Gyazo App is provided
without warranty.
8) I am aware that the Pico Gyazo App will send data
on a secure connection to an external server, that I
may incur data charges from my mobile operator for
this, and that I am responsible for any such charges.
9) I am aware that the Pico Gyazo App will continue to
send data about its usage to the research team for as
long as I use it, but that I can uninstall it from my
phone at any time.
10) I am aware that I have the right to withdraw consent
and discontinue participation before or during the
study. I understand that if I do withdraw I will not be
asked any questions about why I no longer want to
take part.
11) I have freely volunteered to participate in this study.
Be aware: The withdrawal process is only available during
the study. Should this be requested then all data relating to
you will be deleted. After this time, data will be analysed
collectively and it may no longer be practical to remove the
data completely.
I state that I have read the information sheet and am willing to
participate in the experiment being conducted by Dr Frank
Stajano and the Pico Team with the gathering of data as
mentioned above.
To finalise acceptance, please enter your Gyazo account
username (email address) and click on the ‘Accept’ button.
APPENDIX B
INITIAL QUESTIONNAIRE
Many thanks for agreeing to take part in the study. If you
could please complete the single page of questions below. We
will then get in contact using your Gyazo email address.
1) What gender are you?
Female
Male
Other/prefer not to say
2) Please tell us the age range you fall into.
Under 18
18 - 24
25 - 34
35 - 44
45 - 54
55 - 64
65 - 74
75 - 84
85 or older
3) How often do you manually type in your Gyazo
password?
Fewer than once per week
Fewer than once per day
Roughly once per day
Roughly 2-4 times per day
Roughly 5 or more times per day
4) When you type your Gyazo password, explain the
main reason why you have to enter it?
5) Which of these methods for managing your passwords
do you generally use?
Let my browser remember my password
Password manager/plugin/extension (e.g. Last-
Pass, 1Password)
Password generator
Reset password by email when I need to login
Password containing personal information
Stored in a file/on a piece of paper
Using the same password on multiple sites
No special methods (I just remember all of
my passwords)
Other
6) Optionally, please tell us any other thoughts you may
have about your experience using passwords.
7) What sort of smartphone do you use?
Android
iOS
Windows Phone
Blackberry
None
Other
8) Please enter your Google Play email address if you’re
interested in continuing with the trial.
9) That’s all of the questions. Please hit the submit button
to register your answers.
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10) Browser Meta Info
Browser
Version
Operating System
Screen Resolution
Flash Version
Java Support
User Agent
11) Timing
First Click
Last Click
Page Submit
Click Count
APPENDIX C
EXIT QUESTIONNAIRE
Thank you for using Gyazo, and for participating in our Pico-
Gyazo study. Please complete the questions below. At the end,
you’ll be given the opportunity to take part in a debriefing
interview, and we’ll provide details of how you can claim your
reward. Note that your answers won’t be saved until you click
on the Submit button at the bottom of the page.
1) Your Gyazo user name (email address)
2) Please tell us to what extent you agree or disagree
with each of the following statements (Strongly
agree; Somewhat agree; Neither agree nor disagree;
Somewhat disagree; Strongly disagree).
Using Pico requires cognitive effort.
Using Pico requires physical effort.
It is easy to learn how to use Pico.
Pico makes me more efficient.
I am afraid of losing my Pico device and
losing access to my account.
I find scanning the QR codes reliable.
Installation of the Pico-Gyazo app was
straightforward.
I feel secure using Pico to log in to Gyazo.
I am concerned about others observing the
QR code when I log in to Gyazo
Using Pico makes me more concerned about
my smartphone being stolen.
Overall, I find Pico makes my online activity
easier.
3) If you were storing all of your passwords on your
phone, which methods would you feel comfortable
securing your phone with (select as many as you like)?
4-digit PIN
6-digit PIN
Password
Pattern lock
Fingerprint
Slide lock
Facial recognition
No phone lock (I always know where my
phone is)
Other
4) Please drag each of the items below into the box on
the right to rank the ways of improving the Pico app
in order of priority (1=most useful; 8=least useful).
Reduce the download size of the app.
Improve the speed of the app.
Simplify the installation and initial configura-
tion of the app.
Remove the need to scan the QR code to log
in.
Remove the need to have a data connection
when logging in.
Allow me to log in to more websites (not just
Gyazo).
Improve security of the app further.
Allow me to block the app remotely in case
of loss
5) Drag each of the items below into one of the three
boxes provided (Pico; Passwords; Equally comfort-
able/uncomfortable) to indicate whether you would
feel more comfortable using Pico or passwords for
that activity.
Contributing to an online forum.
Buying tickets online.
Browsing for plane tickets.
Checking in for flights online.
Topping up your travel card online.
Bidding on items on an online auction site
(e.g. eBay).
Logging in to a social networking site (e.g.
Facebook) from a different computer.
Unlocking the front door to your home.
Unlocking the door to your office or place of
work.
Paying for an item in a shop.
Unlocking and starting your car.
6) Can you suggest ways that the Pico approach to
authentication could be improved for you?
7) Would you be interested in continuing to use the Pico
Gyazo App to log in to your Gyazo account?
Yes
No
8) Optionally, please tell us any other thoughts you
may have about your experience using Pico, or using
passwords.
9) Thank you for answering our questions. In order to
claim your 10 GBP online voucher as reward, please
select which store you would like the voucher for.
amazon.com
amazon.com.au
amazon.com.br
etc.
10) Would you be willing to take part in an audio-only
debriefing interview via Skype (or similar)? Anyone
who takes part in the debriefing interview will be
rewarded an additional 10 GBP online voucher. If you
answer ‘Yes’ we’ll get in contact by email to arrange
a suitable time.
Yes
No
11) We’ll contact you with information on how to claim
your reward using your Gyazo email address. If you
prefer us to contact you using an alternative email
address, please enter it below.
That’s all of the questions. Please hit the submit button to
register your answers.
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APPENDIX D
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
List of questions used in the interviews, here for interviewee
I05.
Claudio: Hi [participant’s first name]! How are you?
My name is Claudio Dettoni and I’m a researcher at the
University of Cambridge and there is also Kat Krol with me
here in the room.
Kat: Hi [participant’s first name]! My name is Kat.
Claudio: Thank you so much for taking part in the Pico-Gyazo
trial for the past two weeks and thank you for agreeing to this
interview. [pause]
Claudio: Can we just check that you received the Amazon
voucher for taking part in the trial? [pause]
Claudio: Great, thank you.
Kat: So just to give you an overview, this interview now will
take around 20 minutes and we audio-record it because we
can’t take notes fast enough. Can we start the audio-recording?
[pause] In this interview, we will ask you general questions
about how you found using the Pico app during the trial. There
are obviously no right or wrong answers here, we are just
interested in your perceptions and opinions. Have you got any
questions? [pause]
If not, are you happy to start?
1) How did you come to use Gyazo?
a) How long have you been using it?
b) What do you use it for?
c) What devices do you use Gyazo on? [web or
app]
2) How do you normally log in to Gyazo?
3) In what situations are you asked to log in? [If no
constructive answer, use this more direct phrasing:
“Why do you log in this often?”]
4) Are you a premium user? If yes: Do you use password
protected clips? If yes: How do you manage the
passwords for them?
5) In the last two weeks, you used Pico: How was your
experience of using it?
6) You mention that you somewhat disagree that you’re
afraid of losing your Pico. Why is this? Are you
concerned about losing your phone at all? What would
you do in case of a loss?
7) How do you currently lock and unlock your phone?
8) If you were storing all of your passwords on your
phone, you mention you would be happy with a 6-
digit PIN, pattern lock or slide lock. Is this correct?
Is this a change from what you do now?
9) You mention that you would like to remove the need
to scan a QR code to log in. Do you have any thoughts
about how you’d like it to work instead?
10) You also mention that you’d prefer to use passwords
for online forums, buying flights or tickets online.
Why is this?
11) How would you feel about using Pico to bid on eBay
items?
12) How often did you log in using Pico during the two
weeks? [If no constructive answer: Did it change from
how often you previously logged in with passwords?]
13) Did you experience any problems using Pico?
14) What is your general experience with passwords? How
do you manage your passwords? [I05 chose in the
first questionnaire “Let my browser remember my
password”]
15) What was the best thing about Pico?
16) What was the worst thing about Pico?
17) How does Pico compare to passwords? In terms of:
a) Ease of use
b) Speed of login
c) Errors
d) Security
18) What would you change about Pico to make it better?
19) What do you think about the security of Pico?
20) What is the value of the things you share on Gyazo?
How does this value compare to other things that you
need to authenticate to access?
21) Although the trial is over, the Pico-Gyazo service is
going to continue, what are you going to do with the
app? Have you been using the app since you had sent
the final questionnaire?
22) In our implementation, Pico was dedicated to logging
in to Gyazo. What if it was possible to use a Pico app
to log in to other services you are using, such as email,
online shopping etc.? How would you feel about this?
[Logic: Do they see it as a means of logging in to
Gyazo or would they think it could work for other
services too?]
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